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In this paper we analyze a continuous-time model of investment with
uncertainty, irreversibility and a broad class of lumpy adjustment costs. We
show that the two components of the optimal investment strategy, the in-
vestment trigger and the investment increment, can be found sequentially,
and that the optimal investment increment maximizes a closed form func-
tion. Solving the model numerically, we ﬁnd that adding a relatively small
amount of variable adjustment costs often leads ﬁrms to invest in much
smaller increments. We derive a measure of user cost that incorporates
lumpy investment, and use it to show that as ﬁrms invest in bigger incre-
ments, the investment trigger increases as well.
JEL classiﬁcation: E22.
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11 Motivation and Background
Many studies suggest that investment is lumpy. Peck (1974) concludes that turbo-
generator investment is best described by a model with lumpiness. Working with
the Longitudinal Research Database, Doms and Dunne (1994) ﬁnd that during a
17-year period, plants made over half of their investment within their three busiest
years. Using an extended version of the same data set, Cooper et al. (1999) ﬁnd
that the “top ﬁve investment years at each plant account for more than 50 percent
of cumulative aggregate investment.” Goolsbee and Gross (1997) study data from
the Civil Aviation Board. They ﬁnd that “on average, about 60 percent of the
total acquisitions of an aircraft type by a given airline take place in the largest
two-year investment episode.” As Pindyck (1988) remarks, “the assumption that
ﬁrms can continuously and incrementally add capital, though common in economic
models, is extreme. Most investments are lumpy, and sometimes quite so.”1
Several authors study investment cost structures that generate lumpiness; these
include Caballero and Leahy (1996), Eberly (1997), Abel and Eberly (1998) and
Caballero and Engel (1994, 1999).2 Their focus, however, is on the case where ad-
justment costs have a single ﬁxed component.3 This represents a sharp break with
much of the investment literature, where variable adjustment costs, most notably
quadratic ones, play a large role. Although Abel and Eberly (1994) combine both
sorts of costs in their generalized model of non-lumpy investment, in the context
of lumpiness their “augmented adjustment cost function” has received little atten-
tion.4 Our contribution is to extend the analysis of lumpy investment in just this
direction.
1Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000) provide additional references.
2Extensive reviews of the investment literature can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and
Abel and Eberly (1994). A closely related body of work is the analysis of consumer durables
pioneered by Grossman and Laroque (1990), who derive an (S,s) rule for durables purchases. A
recent example is Bertola, et al. (2001).
3Caballero and Leahy (1996) note that their qualitative results hold when a convex adjustment
charge is added to the ﬁxed cost. Caballero and Engel (1994) consider a production function with
two types of capital, with one type adjusting smoothly, and the other type adjusting lumpily.
4Abel and Eberly (1994) consider ﬂow ﬁxed costs, costs that are independent of the size of the
investment ﬂow, but proportional to its duration. Because ﬂow ﬁxed costs vanish as the duration
of the investment ﬂow goes to zero, they generate periods of inaction, but do not generate lumpy
investment. We work with discrete or stock ﬁxed costs, which are independent of both the size
and the duration of the investment ﬂow. The distinction between stock and ﬂow ﬁxed costs
disappears when one moves from a continuous- to a discrete-time framework. Notable discrete-
time studies of lumpy investment include Cooper et al. (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000)
and Khan and Thomas (2003).
2In particular, we consider a ﬁrm choosing the optimal pattern of investment un-
der irreversibility and demand uncertainty. When undertaken, investment causes
discrete jumps in the ﬁrm’s capital stock and its total costs. The ﬁrm’s decision
rule thus consists of two quantities: the investment trigger, the level to which
relative demand–equivalently, the marginal product of capital–must rise before
the ﬁrm invests; and the investment amount, expressed as a fraction of capital at
the trigger. These quantities relate to the ﬁrm’s augmented adjustment costs in a
surprisingly simple way. Our results are fairly general; the main restriction is that
adjustment costs be linearly homogeneous in existing capital and investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
t h em o d e la n dt h eb a s i cf e a t u r e so ft h eﬁrm’s decision rules. In section 3, we solve
the model. We show that the two elements of the ﬁrm’s decision rule–the in-
vestment trigger and the investment amount–can be found sequentially, and that
the optimal investment amount maximizes a closed form function. Because our
“semi-analytical” solution is quite easy to solve numerically, it should be especially
useful to those interested in simulation and/or structural estimation.
In section 4, we use numerical exercises to analyze a variety of cost structures.
We ﬁnd that the interactions between ﬁxed and variable adjustment costs are often
quite important. For example, we ﬁnd that variable adjustment costs can signiﬁ-
cantly reduce the degree of lumpiness that ﬁxed adjustment costs induce–adding
variable adjustment costs often leads ﬁrms to invest in much smaller increments.
In section 5, we use our semi-analytical solution to derive an implicit version of the
user cost of capital. Analyzing this implicit user cost, we show that as investment
becomes more lumpy, the investment trigger increases. We conclude in section 6.
2 The Model and Its Basic Properties
We begin by constructing the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function, using a speciﬁcation common
in the investment literature. Consider a ﬁrm that uses capital and labor to produce











3with ε > 1. Pt is the ﬁrm’s output price. Xt is an exogenous demand shifter
following a geometric Brownian motion with drift:
dXt
Xt
= µdt + σdz, (1)
where dz is an increment to a standard Wiener process.
The ﬁrm pays the constant wage w. Using this fact, it is straightforward to


















Since ε > 1, 0 < γ < 1 and h>0.
The law of motion for capital is
dKt = It − δKtdt. (3)
Because investment, It,i sd e ﬁned as a total increment, rather than a ﬂow rate
(per unit of time), this equation embeds two cases. When there is no investment,
capital depreciates at the constant rate δ:
˙ Kt = −δKt.










t denote the capital stock immediately before and immediately
after time t.
We assume ﬁrms cannot sell their capital, so that investment is always non-
negative:
It ≥ 0.
Although there are many reasons why investment might be irreversible–extreme
speciﬁcity and “lemons” problems in resale markets are two–we have adopted
this restriction in large part to simplify the analysis. One consequence of this
assumption is that there is an option value to delaying investment.5
5Dixit and Pindyck (1994) discuss this point in some detail.
4Normalizing the price of capital to 1, the costs of investing are given by
c(Kt,I t)=νt [It + G(Kt,I t)], (4)
where νt is a 0-1 indicator variable equal to 1 only when investment is positive. νt
ensures that if there are ﬁxed costs to investing, i.e., G(Kt,0) > 0, the costs will
be incurred only when investment is positive.6 We assume that the adjustment
cost G(Kt,I t) is linearly homogeneous in K and I.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a n y ﬁxed
costs to investing are proportional to the existing capital stock.7 Such a ﬁxed cost
structure could occur if, for example, upgrading a machine requires retooling the
entire factory–as the factory grows, so do the costs of retooling it. Beyond the
assumption of homogeneity, which appears throughout the investment literature,
we impose few restrictions on G. Including ﬁxed costs immediately implies that
G need not be convex, and we even consider cases where G is decreasing in It.I n
the numerical treatment, G is usually specialized as [a(I/K − b)2/2+c]K,w h i c h
generalizes the quadratic speciﬁcation used in many recent empirical studies.
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the expected present value of its cash ﬂow–
proﬁts less investment costs–discounted at rate r.L e tCt denote the undiscounted
cumulation of all investment expenses through time t.T h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm is then
given by






−r(s−t) [Π(Ks,X s)ds − dCs]
¾
, (5)
subject to equation (3). The ﬁnal term in the expectation should be interpreted
as a Stieltjes integral. When there are ﬁxed costs to investment, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd
it optimal to invest at distinct points of time si, i =1 ,2,3,...,a n dt h eﬁnal term












−r(si−t) [Isi + G(Ksi,I si)]
)
.
To bound the value of the ﬁrm, we assume that r>µ , so that the ﬁrm’s discount
rate exceeds the growth rate of demand.
6Note that G(Kt,I t) gives stock adjustment costs, rather than ﬂow costs. This means, for
example, that the average cost of a new gas pipeline can vary with its diameter and length, but
not with the speed with which it is built.
7This property implies that ﬁxed costs do not become irrelevant as the ﬁrm grows. Abel
and Eberly (1998) and Cooper et al. (1999) achieve the same result by making the ﬁxed cost
proportional to the demand shifter Xt.
5Let θt ≡ It/Kt denote the ﬁrm’s relative investment. Because adjustment costs
are homogeneous, we can rewrite equation (4) as
c(Kt,I t)=νt [θt + g(θt)]Kt.
















− [θt + g(θt)]K
−
t .
This identity is often referred to as the “value matching condition.”
Now suppose, without loss of generality, that X is ﬁxed, and let V (Kt,X;Ku,θ)
denote the value of a ﬁrm that adopts the strategy of investing θKu whenever
capital depreciates to the level Ku.E v e n i f Ku and θ are suboptimal, a variant
of equation (5) will hold, so that the value matching condition still applies. Then
when Kt = Ku, the value matching condition can be written as
V (Ku,X;Ku,θ)=V ((1 + θ)Ku,X;Ku,θ) − [θ + g(θ)]Ku. (6)
As Dumas (1991) and Dixit (1991) note, and we conﬁrm below, for the optimal










for all values of Kt and X. Intuitively, adopting a better investment rule increases
the ﬁrm’s discounted cash ﬂow at every value of capital and demand. Following
Dumas (1991), one can then totally diﬀerentiate both sides of equation (6) with
respect to θ and Ku to get



















These are variants of the familiar “smooth pasting conditions.”
6To better interpret the ﬁrst order conditions, let yt ≡ Xt/Kt denote the rela-
tive demand for the ﬁrm’s output. Since the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, investment costs and
constraints are all linearly homogeneous in Kt and Xt, so is the value function
V (Kt,X t). It follows that the marginal value of capital, q, is homogeneous of





Inserting this result into the smooth pasting conditions shows that the optimal
investment strategy is a trigger strategy in yt; whenever relative demand yt rises
to the threshold u,t h eﬁrm will invest θK−, driving relative demand down to























The intuition behind equation (7) is the standard one: once the ﬁrm has com-
mitted to invest, it invests until the marginal value of capital equals its marginal
cost. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side of equation (8), q(u∗/(1 + θ
∗)), arises
because q is forward-looking; the marginal value of capital immediately before an
investment depends directly on its marginal value immediately after investment.




∗], captures the way in which changing the
capital stock before investing alters non-marginal adjustment costs, by comparing
marginal and average adjustment costs. If, for example, investment involves only
a ﬁxed cost (g(θ)=c) the latter term will be negative, so that the marginal value
of capital increases when an investment is made. Immediately prior to an invest-
ment, each additional unit of capital entails c units of upcoming ﬁxed adjustment
costs; evidently, the marginal value of capital increases once the investment has
been made.
This discontinuity in the marginal value of capital is, not surprisingly, a function
of our particular speciﬁcation. If investment costs depended only on investment,
i.e., if G(Kt,I t)=G(It)=G(θtKt), the smooth pasting conditions would reduce
to q(K∗,X)=1+G0(I∗)=q(K∗ +I∗,X), the standard condition. In either case,
8We restrict our analysis to the interval [0,u], which forms an absorbing set for y.T h eo p t i m a l
investment strategy for y>uis an interesting but involved topic that we do not pursue here.
7marginal q is of little help in predicting investment. As Caballero and Leahy (1996)
point out, when investment is lumpy, q(y) is not monotone in y,a n dt h e r e f o r e
cannot be a suﬃcient statistic for investment.9
3 The Model’s Solution
The model’s solution involves three steps. The ﬁrst step consists of ﬁnding the law
of motion for the marginal value of capital, q(y), when no investment is taken. In
the second step, the investment trigger u is found as a function of the investment
fraction θ.I nt h eﬁnal step the optimal value of θ is found.
3.1 The Value of Capital When There is No Investment
I nt h o s et i m ei n t e r v a l sw h e r en oi n v e s t m e n to c c u r s ,t h ev a l u eo fc a p i t a le v o l v e si n
the typical fashion. Our treatment most closely follows Abel and Eberly (1996).

































Recalling equations (1) and (3), one can show that in the absence of investment,
relative demand, yt, follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dyt
yt
= λdt + σdz,
λ = µ + δ.
9I nt h ec a s ew h e r eq (u∗)=q (v∗) but u∗ 6= v∗, Caballero and Leahy’s result is immediate. Le
(2002) shows that their result also holds for our speciﬁcation, where q (u∗) need not equal q(v∗).


















where A, B and C are constants to be determined, and αP and αN are the roots










2)z + r + δ =0 .
It can be conﬁrmed that A = h/ρ(γ) > 0,a n dt h a t
αN < 0 < γ < 1 < αP. (13)
This leaves the task of ﬁnding the constants B and C. Note that unless
C =0 ,
the marginal value of capital will explode as relative demand, y, approaches zero.
(With irreversible investment, such an outcome is possible.) We turn to ﬁnding B.
3.2 Finding the Investment Trigger u
Suppose that the ﬁrm follows the possibly suboptimal strategy given by the trigger
u and investment percentage θ. Given this strategy, the value matching condition
given by equation (6) provides a boundary condition that expresses the coeﬃcient
B in equation (12) as a function of u and θ. This relationship in turn allows one
to ﬁnd the optimal investment trigger as a function of the investment fraction θ,
and from there ﬁn dt h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fθ.
Let Q(y) ≡ V (K,X)/K denote Tobin’s (1969) q, the average value of capital.
Recall that the value matching condition restricts the level of the value function.
What we are seeking, however, is the coeﬃcient B in the expression for q(y),t h e
value function’s slope. To convert the value matching condition from a restriction
on levels to a restriction on slopes, we need the following result:


















The proof, which appears in Appendix A, is a straightforward application of linear
homogeneity.
We can now solve for B.L e t Q(y;u,θ) denote the average value of a ﬁrm
that adopts the strategy (u,θ). We will assume throughout that the investment
fraction is strictly positive, with θ =0as a limiting case. Let φ(θ) ≡ θ + g(θ)
denote investment costs per unit of existing capital. Using this notation, the value
































where D ≡ λ + 1
2γσ2, E ≡ λ + 1
2αPσ2 and H ≡ h/(1 − γ) − AD. Inserting these
results into equation (15) (so that y = u), the value matching condition becomes11
u
γ[(1 + θ)
1−γ − 1]H − BEu
αP[(1 + θ)
1−αP − 1] = (r − µ)φ(θ). (17)






(γ − αP)(γ − αN)(1 − γ)σ2, (18)
so that equation (17) implies
B =
µ − r
E[(1 + θ)1−αP − 1]
·
2h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]uγ−αP





10Although Lemma 1 technically applies to the value function for the optimal strategy, Q(y)=
Q(y;u∗,θ
∗), the homogeneity properties that make it hold also apply to Q(y;u,θ). Similarly,
the law of motion for q(y) given by equation (12) also holds for q (y;u,θ).
11Even if V (·) is not diﬀerentiable at the investment trigger u, one can apply Lemma 1 by
taking limits as y approaches u from below.
10It follows from equation (16) that u and θ aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm only to
the extent they aﬀect B. This implies that the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal














In Appendix C, we show that this ﬁrst order condition implies
u(θ)
γ =
αPφ(θ)(γ − αN)(1 − γ)σ2
2h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]
, (20)








(1 − γ)(r + δ)φ(θ)
h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]
. (21)
In Appendix D, we conﬁrm that equation (21) identiﬁes a maximum.
It follows from equation (13) that u(θ)
γ and thus u(θ) are strictly positive.










.( 2 2 )
This expression can be shown to be negative, so that B is negative.
Combining equations (12) and (22) (and recalling the deﬁnition of φ(θ)) reveals
that for any investment fraction θ, the marginal value of capital is
q(y;θ)=Ay
γ +
γ(r − µ)[θ + g(θ)]













σ2(γ − αN)(1 − γ)
+
γ[θ + g(θ)]





.( 2 4 )
113.3 Finding the Investment Fraction θ
Having found the marginal and average value of capital for arbitrary values of θ,w e
turn to ﬁnding the optimal investment fraction. Recalling equation (13), it follows




1 − (1 + θ)1−αP u(θ)
−αP .
But the optimal investment trigger u(θ) is given by equation (21), so that
θ
∗ =a r gm a x
θ≥0
[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]
αP/γ
1 − (1 + θ)1−αP [θ + g(θ)]
1−αP/γ .( 2 5 )
In Appendix F, we verify that the ﬁrst order conditions to this maximization
problem satisfy the smooth pasting conditions given by equations (7) and (8).
In short, the optimal investment policy can be found by solving equation (25)
for θ
∗, and inserting the optimizing value into equation (21) to ﬁnd the investment
trigger u∗ = u(θ
∗). In general, the optimal investment fraction θ
∗ must be found
numerically. Fortunately, equation (25) is quite easy to solve. In the next section,
we use this numerical solution to analyze a variety of cost structures.
4 Numerical Analyses
Using the methodology described immediately above, we can ﬁnd the optimal in-
vestment fraction, θ
∗, for any well-behaved adjustment cost structure. To facilitate
comparison with the existing literature, we examine, separately and then jointly,
the two most familiar adjustment cost structures: the pure ﬁxed cost, g(θ)=c;
and the quadratic variable cost g(θ)=a(θ − b)2/2.
4.1 Calibration
Throughout the numerical analyses, we utilize the following parameter values:
1. γ =0 .431. This follows from a capital share, β,o f0.33,f r o mA b e la n dE b e r l y
(1999), and a demand elasticity, ε,o f5, from Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000).
2. σ =0 .05 and µ =0 .03. We derive demand volatility, σ,a n dg r o w t h ,µ,
from Abel and Eberly (1999) and from data on U.S. post-tax corporate
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Figure 1: θ
∗ as a Function of the Fixed Cost c
3. δ =0 .06 and r =0 .04. These values are fairly standard. (See, for example,
Veracierto, 1998.)
4. αP =1 .1094. This is the positive solution to ρ(z)=0 ,u s i n gt h ev a l u e sf o r
µ,σ, r and δ listed above.
4.2 Pure Fixed Cost
We begin with the adjustment cost structure that has received the most attention
in the study of lumpiness, the pure ﬁxed cost: g(θ)=c. This case appears as the
top (a =0 ) line of Figure 1, which shows θ
∗ as a function of the ﬁxed cost c.( W e
discuss the rest of Figure 1 further below.) Figure 1 shows that ﬁxed adjustment
costs can have large eﬀects: for example, a ﬁxed cost equal to 0.2 percent of the
capital stock generates an investment fraction of over 40 percent.
In Appendix G, we show that one can approximate the ﬁrst-order condition for









13Abel and Eberly (1998) derive similar cubic approximations while analyzing their
analogues to u and u/(1 + θ).12 These approximations conﬁrm that θ
∗ can be
quite sensitive to ﬁxed costs. In particular, the derivative of θ
∗ with respect to c
is inﬁnite at c =0 .
4.3 Pure Variable Cost
The familiar quadratic adjustment cost, g(θ)=a(θ−b)2/2, appears extensively in
the empirical literature.13 As shown below, the parameter b in many ways acts as
a ﬁxed cost. We thus begin our analysis with the purest case, g(θ)=aθ
2/2,w h e r e
adjustment costs are completely variable. For any a ≥ 0, the solution is θ
∗ =0 ;i f
a ﬁrm wants to invest the total amount Θ in M increments, the total adjustment
cost, M ×a(Θ/M)
2 /2, is minimized with θ ≡ Θ/M =0 . Investment follows what












which is the trigger condition for smooth irreversible investment shown in Abel
and Eberly (1996).
12The approximations diﬀer because Abel and Eberly (1998) assume that the ﬁxed cost c is
proportional to the demand shifter Xt, rather than the capital stock. This seemingly minor
diﬀerence in speciﬁcation also changes the way in which the model must be solved. In particular,








− [θ + cu].
With this change, θ
∗ and u∗ must be found simultaneously, rather than in sequence.
13See, for example, Chirinko (1993), Cummins et al. (1994, 1996), Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), Hassett and Hubbard (1996), and Oliner et al. (1996).
14An intuitive discussion of barrier control can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter
11). Recall that θ = I/K,w h e r eI measures the total investment increment, rather than the
ﬂow rate of investment per unit of time. Under barrier control any such investment increments
are inﬁnitesimal, but when they occur their ﬂow rate is inﬁnite. Barrier control is therefore
optimal for the convex stock adjustment costs we consider here (as it minimizes our version of
θ), even though it would not be optimal for convex ﬂow adjustment costs. A formal treatment
of barrier control appears in Harrison and Taksar (1983). Although the control variable in
Harrison and Taksar’s framework is the cumulation of all investment, while our control variable
is the investment increment I, in the limit the two frameworks yield the same investment process;
as Harrison, Sellke and Taylor (1983) point out, as ﬁxed costs approach zero “impulse control"
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Figure 2: θ
∗ as a Function of the Adjustment Cost Parameter a
Lumpiness re-emerges when a is negative, so that there are increasing returns to
investment. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows θ
∗ for a range of negative
values of a. As the analysis of the pure ﬁxed cost already showed, increasing
returns do not rule out a bounded solution; the key regularity condition is not
that the adjustment cost g(θ) be convex, but rather that the function maximized
in equation (25) be well-behaved.15 Intuitively, if the proﬁtf u n c t i o nΠ(K,X) is
suﬃciently concave, the ﬁrm’s problem will have an interior solution even when
g(θ) is non-convex.
4.4 Full Quadratic Form
The most interesting speciﬁcation is the full quadratic form, g(θ)=
a(θ − b)2/2+c. To analyze this case, we calibrate two additional parameters:
1. a =1 . Relating this parameter to the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s q in an invest-
ment equation, Hassett and Hubbard (1996) suggest that a is between 1 and
2. Estimating a structural model, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000) ﬁnd a to
be less than 0.1.
15An important early study of smooth, as opposed to ﬁxed-cost-driven, concave adjustment
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Figure 3: θ
∗ as a Function of the Adjustment Cost Parameter b
2. −0.25 ≤ b ≤ 0.25. This covers the range of reasonable reported estimates.
For example, Cummins et al. (1994) ﬁnd that |b| is less than 0.25,a n di s
usually less than 0.03. Another common approach is to assume that there
are no adjustment costs along a balanced growth path, so that b = δ +µ:i n
our case, this would imply that b =0 .09.
Figure 3 shows the values of θ
∗ generated by this calibration, for diﬀerent values
of the ﬁxed cost c.T h eb o t t o m( c =0 )l i n eo ft h i sﬁgure deserves mention. When
c is set to 0, g(θ) reduces to a(θ − b)2/2. In this case the optimal value of θ has a
surprisingly precise and simple approximation: θ
∗ = |b|.S i n c eθ = b minimizes the
adjustment cost g(θ), it is not surprising that thea p p r o x i m a t i o nh o l d sf o rb>0.
What is surprising is that it holds for b<0. To understand this symmetry further,
deﬁne the function h(θ) such that equation (25) can be written as
θ

























It immediately follows that if θ
∗ = b0 satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition when b = b0,
it also satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition when b = −b0.
Note that g(0) = ab2/2+c,s ot h a ti nm a n yw a y sb is a ﬁxed cost like c.
It is therefore not surprising that the interactions between the two parameters
depend on their relative sizes. It is also useful to recall Figure 1, which shows that
θ
∗ exhibits diminishing returns in c. This suggests that if c (or b)i sl a r g e ,t h e
incremental eﬀect of b (or c) will be small. For example, the incremental eﬀect of
b is the smallest on the top (c =0 .05) line of Figure 3, where the ﬁxed cost c is
the largest.
The interactions between the ﬁxed cost c and the parameter a, which deter-
mines the relative weight of the quadratic term, are also quite interesting. Figure 1,
which shows the values of θ
∗ that arise when g(θ)=c+aθ
2/2, reveals that even a
small amount of variable adjustment costs (a =0 .1) can signiﬁcantly dampen the
eﬀects of ﬁxed adjustment costs. This is consistent with Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2000), who ﬁt a (discrete-time) structural model to their lumpy investment data,
and ﬁnd a to be less than 0.05. A similar set of implications appears in Figure 4,
which shows that when b =0 ,h i g h e rv a l u e so fa lead to considerably less in-
vestment. Figure 4 also shows that when c is small (0.0 or 0.002)a n db is large
(0.25), the approximation θ
∗ = |b| holds for nearly all values of a;t h es l o p eo ft h e
adjustment cost function can be as important as its size.
In short, variable adjustment costs can signiﬁcantly alter a ﬁrm’s investment
strategy. It immediately follows that for any given value of the ﬁxed cost c,t h e
standard practice of ignoring variable costs can lead to extremely inaccurate pre-
dictions. Even if c is calibrated or estimated to replicate some feature of the data,
a speciﬁcation that excludes variable adjustment costs is a reduced form, with
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∗ as a Function of the Adjustment Cost Parameter a
5 Augmented User Cost
As formulated by Jorgenson (1963), the user cost of holding capital, U(y), consists
of interest and depreciation costs, less any gains in the price of capital. Abel
and Eberly (1996) generalize this measure by replacing the price of capital (here
normalized to 1) with q(y), its marginal value to the ﬁrm:




Since y follows a geometric Brownian motion, it follows from Ito’s Lemma that
the expected change in the value of capital is
1
dt

























Imposing equation (11), the implicit user cost of capital reduces to
U(y)=hy
γ. (26)








equation (26) shows that the implicit user cost of a unit of capital always equals
its marginal revenue product, hyγ.
Although this implicit user cost cannot be interpreted as the competitive rental
rate of capital, as could the traditional user cost, it can still be used to ﬁnd the
marginal revenue product of capital at the time of an investment. This in turn
can be used to interpret the investment trigger u∗. In particular, it follows from























U (u∗) c a nb eb r o k e ni n t ot h r e ec o m p o n e n t s :
1. The sum of interest and depreciation costs:
(r + δ)[1 + g(θ
∗)/θ
∗].
Note that the ﬁrm behaves as if interest and depreciation expenses are in-
curred on adjustment costs as well as the new capital actually installed.





Abel and Eberly (1996) show that the implicit user cost for a ﬁrm facing irre-
versibility but no ﬁxed costs is (1 − γ/αN)(r+δ), as opposed to the standard
measure of r + δ. For the parameters used in the preceding subsection, the
irreversibility eﬀect is quite small: −γ/αN ≈ 0.006.






With 0 < γ < 1, (1 + θ)1−γ is a concave function, so that for positive θ,
(1+θ)1−γ < 1+(1− γ)θ and the ratio is bigger than 1.A sθ
∗ increases, and
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Figure 5: User Costs as Functions of the Adjustment Cost Parameter a
and thus the investment trigger u∗, both grow as well. This immediately
implies that the trigger capital stock, K∗ = Xt/u∗,i sd e c r e a s i n gi nθ
∗:w h e n
investment is lumpy, ﬁrms let their capital depreciate further before they
invest. By way of example, in the model with c =0 .002 and a =0 ,t h e
optimal value of θ is 0.444, and lumpiness increases user cost by 8.65 percent.
Intuitively, a discrete increase in the capital stock causes a drop in relative
demand, y, and thus a decrease in the marginal revenue product of capital.
This upcoming drop in marginal product is a cost of investing that does not
occur when capital evolves smoothly.
Note that the eﬀects of irreversibility and lumpiness compound; as investments
get larger, the ﬂexibility losses they entail get larger as well, so that the investment
trigger rises. For example, in the model with c =0 .002 and a =0(so that
θ
∗ =0 .444), the implicit user cost is roughly 0.11,a b o u t10% higher than the
conventional value of 0.10.
The eﬀects of irreversibility and lumpiness are illustrated further in Figure 5,
which shows diﬀerent (mis-) measures of the user cost for the full quadratic form,
g(θ)=a(θ − b)2/2+c, using three of the speciﬁcations shown in Figure 4. In
20interpreting this ﬁgure, it is useful to note that the standard user cost, (r+δ),a n d
implicit user cost under irreversibility, (1 − γ/αN)(r +δ),a r et h es a m ef o ra l lt h e
adjustment cost speciﬁcations.
6C o n c l u s i o n
For a broad class of adjustment costs, the optimal pattern of investment under
lumpiness has a convenient analytical characterization. The ﬁrm’s decision rule
consists of an investment quantity, which can be found by maximizing a closed form
function, and an investment trigger, which can be expressed as a function of the
investment quantity. This makes the decision rule quite easy to study. Moreover,
the user cost theory of investment can be extended to incorporate lumpiness in a
very intuitive way.
While lumpy investment models with ﬁxed adjustment costs have been studied
extensively, our approach allows us to consider combinations of ﬁxed and variable
adjustment costs as well. Some straightforward numerical analyses show that the
investment policy under a combination of ﬁxed and variable adjustment costs is
often quite diﬀerent from the policy under a pure ﬁxed cost. For example, adding
a relatively small amount of convex adjustment costs can lead ﬁrms to invest in
much smaller increments. These results suggest that the standard ﬁxed-cost-only
speciﬁcation is an approximation that should be used with some caution.
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7.1 Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1












= V (K,X) − Kq(y). (28)








































which is equivalent to equation (14).
7.2 Appendix B: Derivation of Equation (18)






































(γ − αP)(γ − αN). (33)
Recalling further that,






h − AD(1 − γ)=h + h
2D(1 − γ)
(γ − αP)(γ − αN)σ2
= h
(γ − αP)(γ − αN)σ2 +2 D(1 − γ)
(γ − αP)(γ − αN)σ2
= h
γ2σ2 +2 λγ − γσ2 − 2r − 2δ +2 λ + γσ2 − 2λγ − γ2σ2
(γ − αP)(γ − αN)σ2 ,
with the last line following from equations (31) and (32). With λ = µ + δ,t h i s
simpliﬁes to
h − AD(1 − γ)=
2h(µ − r)
(γ − αP)(γ − αN)σ2,
which is equivalent to equation (18) in the main text.
7.3 Appendix C: Calculation of the Upper Trigger u






(γ − αP)2h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]uγ−αP−1












αPφ(θ)(γ − αN)(1 − γ)σ2
2h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]
. (35)










h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]
.
7.4 Appendix D: Second-order Condition for Optimal u













(γ − αP − 1)2h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]uγ−αP−1
(γ − αN)σ2(1 − γ)




the sign of which is given by the sign of
(γ − αP − 1)2h[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]uγ
(γ − αN)σ2(1 − γ)
+( αP +1 )αPφ(θ).
Upon inserting equation (35), this expression simpliﬁes to
(γ − αP − 1)αPφ(θ)+αP(αP +1 ) φ(θ) > 0.
7.5 Appendix E: Derivation of Q(y;θ)
The marginal value of capital is
q(y;θ)=Ay
γ +
γ(r − µ)[θ + g(θ)]






Imposing the expression for A given in Appendix B yields
q(y,θ)=−
2hyγ
σ2(γ − αP)(γ − αN)
−
γ(r − µ)φ(θ)u−αP








σ2(γ − αP)(γ − αN)
−
αPγ(r − µ)φ(θ)u−αP
(γ − αP)E[(1 + θ)1−αP − 1]
y
αP.






σ2(γ − αP)(γ − αN)
+
γλ(r − µ)φ(θ)u−αP





(γ − αP)(γ − αN)
+
αPγσ2(r − µ)φ(θ)u−αP




σ2(γ − αP)(γ − αN)+2 λ(1 − γ)+( 1− γ)γσ2




γ(r − µ)φ(θ)u−αP(2λ + αPσ2)
2(γ − αP)E[(1 + θ)1−αP − 1]
y
αP.
Inserting equations (31) and (32), and recalling that E = λ+ 1

















σ2(γ − αN)(1 − γ)
−
γφ(θ)







7.6 Appendix F: Veriﬁcation of the Smooth Pasting Con-
ditions
Recall from equation (25) that θ solves
argmax
θ0≥0
(γ −αP)log[θ0 +g(θ0)] −γ log[1 −(1 + θ0)
1−αP]+αP log[(1 + θ0)
1−γ −1].






γ(1 − αP)(1 + θ)−αP
1 − (1 + θ)1−αP +
αP(1 − γ)(1 + θ)−γ
(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
¸
, (36)
which can be written as
(1 + θ)−αP





(γ − αP)[1 + g0(θ)]
θ + g(θ)
+ αP
(1 − γ)(1 + θ)−γ
(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
¸
. (37)









γ(r − µ)[θ + g(θ)]
(αP − γ)E[(1 + θ)1−αP − 1]
(1 + θ)
−αP.








(r − µ)[θ + g(θ)]
(αP − γ)(1 − αP)E
αP
(1 − γ)(1 + θ)−γ
(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
.
Applying equation (32), we have









Moreover, it follows from Appendix B and the deﬁnition of λ that
(1 − αP)(1 − αN)=2
µ − r
σ2 .
Combining these results yields
(1 − αP)E = µ − r.








(1 − γ)(1 + θ)−γ
(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
. (39)




−σ2(γ − αP)(γ − αN)/2
×
αPφ(θ)(γ − αN)(1 − γ)σ2




(αP − γ)[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]
.







(1 − γ)(1 + θ)−γ




0(θ).( 4 1 )
This veriﬁes the ﬁrst of the smooth pasting conditions.









(1 − γ)(1 + θ)−γ








αP(1 − γ)[θ + g(θ)]
(αP − γ)[(1 + θ)1−γ − 1]
[1 − (1 + θ)
αP−γ]. (42)
Using equations (41) and (42), we have
(αP − γ)[q(u) − (1 + θ)q(v)]
θ + g(θ)
=[ ( 1+θ)
αP − (1 + θ)]




(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
[1 − (1 + θ)
αP−γ]. (43)
Note that equation (36) can be written as
[(1+θ)
αP−(1+θ)]
(αP − γ)[1 + g0(θ)]
θ + g(θ)
= γ(1−αP)+
αP(1 − γ)[(1 + θ)αP−γ − (1 + θ)1−γ]
(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
.
Inserting this result into equation (43) yields
(αP − γ)[q(u) − (1 + θ)q(v)]
θ + g(θ)
= γ(1 − αP)+
αP(1 − γ)
(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
[1 − (1 + θ)
1−γ]
= γ(1 − αP) − αP(1 − γ)=γ − αP,
or
q(u)=( 1+θ)q(v) − [θ + g(θ)].
This veriﬁes the second smooth pasting condition.
277.7 Appendix G: Local Approximation of θ
We begin with some background results. It follows from the Taylor series expansion
of (1 + θ)αP that
(1 + θ)










αP (αP − 2)
6
+
























2 θ + θ
2J (θ)
¤,
so that after some polynomial division,
θ
















αP (αP − 2)
6(1− αP)
,
and the remaining j’s are coeﬃcients on a bounded remainder. It follows that
γ(1 − αP)θ







γαP (αP − 2)
6
θ







Similarly, it can be shown that
θ


































γαP (2 − γ)
6
θ










Combining equations (45) and (46) shows that
γ(1 − αP)θ
(1 + θ)αP − (1 + θ)
+
αP(1 − γ)θ

















γαP (αP − 2)
6
+






















Returning to the main problem, recall from equation (36) that the ﬁrst order






γ(1 − αP)θ(1 + θ)−αP
1 − (1 + θ)1−αP +
αP(1 − γ)θ(1 + θ)−γ
(1 + θ)1−γ − 1
¸
. (49)





(1 + θ)αP − (1 + θ)
+
αP(1 − γ)
1+θ − (1 + θ)γ.





































































































































3 − θS (θ)
1+
αP+γ
2 θ + 1
6γαPθ
2 + S (θ)
.
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